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Abstract Content:

Members of Congress appropriated the 1892 labor conflict at Homestead, Pennsylvania
as a point of partisan rhetorical debate over the ills or benefits of the 1890 McKinley Tariff. This
appropriation demonstrated how congress found the tariff in general useful not only for
engaging public concerns over industrial era woes like wage insecurity, but also for deflecting
public discussion away from an underlying federal helplessness to mitigate those same
detrimental effects of industrial capitalism.

iii

“How About the Tariff and Homestead?”
Homestead, Tariff Rhetoric, and Wage Insecurity in 1892
Introduction
In early July 1892 by the side of the Monongahela River, the workers at one of Andrew
Carnegie’s Pennsylvania steel mills gathered firearms and took cover in the sand behind huge
piles of metal beams they themselves had forged. There, they repelled two barges of some 300
armed Pinkerton troops that arrived to secure the plant against the massive patrol of striking
workers. After a lengthy attempted siege, nearly the entire force of Pinkertons surrendered and
gave themselves up to a force of angry townsfolk numbering in the thousands. The townsfolk
set the barges ablaze and marched their prisoners to makeshift detention. They formed a
gauntlet which included women and children, spitting at the Pinkertons and beating them along
the way. The final death toll for both forces showed ten men dead and many more wounded.1
Bizarrely, much of the congressional debate about the bloody shootout centered around the
various effects of tariff taxation.
In 1892 an exaggerated political debate about the effects of tariff rates upon the
national labor crisis obscured a general federal refusal to reform worker rights, even as the
bloody shootout at Homestead demonstrated that such a measure was sorely needed. Many of
the federal legislators who attempted to address the incident twisted its narrative into a debate
about its tariff implications. The tariff issue in 1892 had become a political tool for
appropriating issues far beyond its practical explanatory scope. It remains for further studies to
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reveal how other issues from 1888 to 1892 might also have been obscured by the tariff
emphasis. But apropos of labor strife the distracting nature of tariff rhetoric upon the
Homestead episode was not an incidental but a useful effect for Congress. Federal legislators
were largely unwilling to encroach upon the ownership rights of capitalists, a legislative
direction necessary for deflating the underlying tensions behind the raging labor wars. At all
levels of government the de facto policy on mitigating the labor strife which wracked the
country was to support or enact the physical policing of laborers rather than reform the
systems which gave rise to their grievances. But and this was not a stance federal legislators
were prepared to emphasize in an election year. Recently wage workers had become the
largest workforce in the country and were therefore an important electoral demographic. By
altering the Homestead narrative to focus on the tariff— an issue which had very little
implications for the strike and its ensuing violence— congressmen could avoid admitting their
inability or unwillingness to reform the practical forces beneath the incident and focus instead
on an unrelated political duel.
The Homestead conflict has been historically emblematic of a national backlash against
“Pinkertonism,” the hire of private troops to sabotage unions and break up strikes.2
Pinkertonism was indeed a primary feature of the Homestead incident. The Pinkerton Detective
Agency hired contract workers from out of state to participate in the Homestead siege, and
congressmen responding to the incident discussed the prospect of outlawing the practice based
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on their constitutional jurisdiction over interstate commerce. This proposed legislative
prohibition became the basis of two congressional investigations that year. But while Congress
shaped most of the jurisdictional justification for its investigations into Homestead around
possible Pinkerton lawbreaking, much of the actual congressional debate of the incident
centered around its implications for both parties’ flagship tariff policies.
Unlike the anti-Pinkertonism angle, tariff rates were a terrible practical explanation for
the events at Homestead. But Democrats on the attack in an election year found that tariff
culpability made for perfect rhetorical logic. Both parties generally agreed that protectionism in
its broad contours benefited the growth of iron and steel industries, whatever their assessment
of its impact on American workers and the overall economy. Barely a month after the
Republican election committee officially re-committed their party to President Harrison’s
reelection and a high-protection tariff plank, tariff arch-beneficiary Carnegie Steel Company had
deliberately incited a strike at their Homestead steel mill by reducing wages, among other
contract demands. The shootout that followed showed the nation exactly how un-beholden
Carnegie Steel was to the Republican tariff largess. Republicans, the Democrats asserted, were
rewarding the villains of the national industrial-capitalist stage.
It is difficult to convey exactly how heated the tariff debate had become in 1892. The
tariff issue was part of a new national emphasis on “Dinner Pail” issues which eclipsed the
“Bloody Shirt” of Civil War tensions.3 Since 1887, tariff rates—on the surface a seemingly boring
subject for generating political enthusiasm— had in fact become the perfect political rhetorical
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mechanism for captivating the interest of a country reeling from the impacts of an ascendant
industrial capitalism. As a result of this phenomenon, tariff talk interlaced congressional
deliberations about Homestead. A special House Judiciary committee was even directed to
investigate the possibility that tariff mismanagement had actually caused the Homestead
violence.
In the 1888 and 1892 national campaigns both political parties elevated their respective
tariff planks above all others because they were counterparts in a useful rhetorical mechanism.
In practical terms the tariff was the means for leveraging federal power to foster various
economic sectors. But the tariff issue could also be leveraged for rhetorical effect to assign
blame for the woes of industrial capitalism and credit for its marvels. Both major parties had
their own version of this mechanism. Republicans emphasized a rhetoric of trickle-down
economics. They claimed high protection made employment more likely by encouraging
domestic growth, and they blamed Democrats for threatening those jobs with what they
derogatorily referred to as their “free trade” or “British” (favoring) system. Democrats by
contrast emphasized a message which promised better living through cheaper goods.
Democrats claimed wages would have more buying power under a reformed, more lax tariff
because foreign competition would encourage manufacturers on both sides of the Atlantic to
compete for their dollars. They blamed Republicans for inflating trusts on the consumers’ dime,
a practice they argued amounted to a hidden tax. Workers were also consumers, and so minor
losses in jobs resulting from a competitive tariff rate would be offset by the boon of cheaper
goods upon workers’ pocketbooks.
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Neither of these political positions were fundamentally incorrect, but they diverted the
national dialogue over the new industrial upheavals from the real issue of capital power, and
onto the surface issue of spoils. While specific tariff changes had concrete implications for
specific industries, the range of politically palpable tariff measures displayed from 1888 to 1894
were relatively slight. Comparisons of the Democrats’ defeated 1888 Mills tariff bill, the
Republican McKinley bill of 1892, and the 1894 Wilson-Gorman tariff bill reveal variances too
small to significantly impact the dramatic large-scale industrial age challenges to working class
opportunities during those years. Tariff rhetoric focused national attention on who was being
rewarded rather than real economic and legislative solutions to the country’s problems.
Congressional discussion around the labor riot at Homestead showed how the spoils-emphasis
of tariff rhetoric had become legislators’ popular framework for national economic analysis, but
it also demonstrated how unsuitable it was for that purpose.
To a significant extent in 1892 economics had become rhetorically synonymous with the
tariff, and so the House query about the tariff’s role in the Homestead violence was ultimately
what passed for a federal economic analysis of the incident. Tariff talk certainly dominated
economic discussions of Homestead in the newspapers. But when congressmen on the House
Judiciary investigation into Homestead seriously applied the tariff lens to the strike, Democrats
found its practical effect upon the incident to be negligible, and so they fell silent. For them,
tariff rhetoric had already performed its function and laid the initial election-season blame for
the shootout at Republicans’ feet. Outraged Republicans on the committee followed the inquiry
past the election into the next session. In 1893 there were few political points to be won, but
nevertheless Republicans on the judiciary convincingly showed how the tariff had no real
5

bearing on the labor shootout— unless the public wanted to congratulate high protectionism
for “creating” the Homestead plant and Carnegie Steel in the first place. Neither party cared to
follow the implication that the tariff had no power to alter the issues that led to Homestead,
and by extension that tariff alterations could not alleviate the chronic labor strife Homestead
represented. They certainly had no interest in the broader implication that the tariff was a poor
substitute for serious economic analysis. Tariff rhetoric was simply too popular and too useful
to abandon.
Wage insecurity, the real crisis at the heart of the Homestead union struggle, was a
manifestation of the industrial-capitalist upheaval and not the result of mismanaged tariff rates.
Republicans on the judiciary committee essentially proved this point when they discovered that
Homestead workers and their dependents were fairly well off, but they called this a
manifestation of Republican protectionism. In fact union power played a significant role in
having secured the steady, decent wages Homestead workers enjoyed. Testimony in the House
investigation revealed that the Amalgamated Association of Iron and Steel Workers fought to
maintain union influence over the plant more as a means to assert control over future wage
negotiations; they fought not primarily against the immediate wage reduction the company
proposed, but against the company’s implicit assertion of its own power to regularly reduce its
workers’ wages without credible evidence of economic necessity.4 Wage insecurity was a broad
working class issue, by no means confined to the Homestead riot or even to union struggles. As
long as the inability of US workers to guarantee a secure economic future for themselves as
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wage laborers went fundamentally unaddressed, this need would continue to spawn similar
conflicts. This observation was exactly what Senator Palmer of Illinois pointed out in congress
the very next day after the shootout: the labor wars would rage eternal unless federal
legislators expanded their jurisdiction to interfere with wage negotiations in some way. In
response, many newspapers dismissed this analysis with cries of “Communism!” The legislators
in chambers mostly ignored him and returned to the politically safer terrain of tariff talk.
Senator Palmer’s assessment was most likely accurate, as continued labor strife in the
immediate future would indicate. America had to change, but all reasonably effective solutions
were un-American. Palmer’s fellow congressmen in 1892 were free to ignore his analysis
because tariff rhetoric allowed them to avoid publicly admitting even the strong possibility of
the indefinite stalemate he described. Politicians were not free to simply say that the union had
lockjaw and there were no electorally or philosophically viable political solutions to the
shrinking power of laborers. They might not even have allowed themselves to seriously see
Congress as “trapped” in this regard. Avoiding this sentiment either consciously or
unconsciously was the real significance and power of tariff rhetoric in discussions of labor strife.
The rhetorical logic of tariff analysis in 1892 encouraged a shallow, surface gloss over
the nationally important issue of wage security. This in turn effectively protected the politicaleconomic status quo. The prospect of a serious look at the Homestead episode of the national
labor struggle invited congressmen to come face to face with a blind spot in constitutional and
common-law legal theory. Their colleague Senator Palmer made this invitation explicit. The
legal framework of the nation protected the citizenry from the excesses of monarchical but not
capitalist power consolidation. But instead of seizing this opportunity to address the underlying
7

labor crisis as statesmen, congressmen used the tariff issue to spar as partisan warriors. As a
result the Homestead investigation had little political consequence except as ammunition for
the Democrats’ presidential victory that year. Congressmen saw no clear way to address the
labor issues underlying the Homestead violence, but the tariff issue obscured that conundrum
for them by giving the public an emotionally satisfying battle.

Historiography
The historiographical purpose of this exploration into the congressional Homestead and
tariff coverage is to complicate recent historical works seeking to rehabilitate late nineteenthcentury political culture from the popular perception that it was mired by an overall
disingenuousness. This purported disingenuousness had many aspects, respectively attacked by
recent historians. The first of these aspects and the largest in scope concerns the comparison
between the “Gilded Age and its “Progressive Era” successor. Recent works like those of Gilded
Age historian Rebecca Edwards and Progressive Era historian Daniel T. Rodgers have capstoned
a historiographical campaign to refute an earlier understanding that the Progressive Era was a
kind of forward thinking and acting corrective to a “backward” Gilded Age.5 But whatever the
conclusion a comparison between the two ages does not address the contemporaneous Gilded
Age charge that government was slow to respond to systemic changes. The unprecedented
success of the People’s Party in 1893—a success predicated on the perception of capitalist
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predations—demonstrates that many people in the late nineteenth-century considered the
mainstream government response to the massive shifts in economic infrastructure intolerably
slow-paced. The tariff issue was emblematic of this slow-paced response. It was a stalling tactic
redolent of a political system ill-adapted to the new capitalist modes of production.
Political impotence to properly counter these shifts on behalf of working people was not
the result of an overall philosophical disingenuousness, a charge often levied at the Gilded Age.
Academic history of the late nineteenth-century has been saddled with countering an
unfortunate broad-strokes literary theme— what might be termed Gilded Age noire. Scholars
like Charles C. Calhoun have shown that late nineteenth-century politicians for the most part
sincerely believed in their respective political positions. A tight electoral stalemate was
significantly at fault for the legislative slog in the face of rapid infrastructural change. However,
recent historiographical efforts to rehabilitate the Gilded Age against its popular reputation as
vacuous and corrupt obscure the realpolitik benefits of stalemate. In the case of labor strife, the
tariff distraction bought time for politicians who had no ready solutions. This benefit had
nothing to do with corruption or, strictly speaking, political job-seeking. The Homestead
investigation revealed how tariff rhetoric had a stalling effect on real political change, and this
was a significant impetus for its popularity with politicians on both sides of the aisle.
Gilded Age noire stems originally from sensational literary sources from within the late
19th century itself, featuring tales of gluttonous robber barons bribing self-serving politicos. The
classic example is the novel written by Mark Twain coining the phrase “Gilded Age.” The novel
featured a national fever for land speculation and its seedy connection to the corrupt politics of
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the day.6 The charge of bribery was often levied by both parties against the other. It was
facilitated in large part by the melodramatic barbs thrown back and forth by journalists in an
era in which nearly all major newspapers were political organs in service to the two political
parties.7 The noire lens was also inspired by the rise of cheap working class literature known as
dime novels, which featured proto-pulp stories compounding the corruption themes in the
daily news. The dime novels and cheap sheets may have enjoyed better circulation among the
working class than even the most popular newspapers of the day.8 Some notable historical
works in the subsequent Progressive Era even contributed to the sense that their predecessors
were money-obsessed, with little differences between political parties.9
Present scholarship on the machinations of Gilded Age politicians from the 1970s to the
present day refute various aspects of the disingenuousness previously purported to underpin
the late nineteenth-century political scene. For instance, in an essay on late 19th century
political culture Calhoun shows how the balance in electoral math between the industrial north
and the solid south dictated that radical proposals were tantamount to political suicide: “With
the outcome of elections in doubt, party leaders and spokesmen saw the need to exercise
caution in articulating party positions and were wary of getting too far ahead of public
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opinion.”10 Several of Calhoun’s several works tacitly “rehabilitate” the stereotype of “Gilded
Age” corruption by adhering to a strictly political narrative showing earnest politicians engaged
in heartfelt struggle. 11 In this setting any forward progress was the result of truly herculean
lobbying, not the lackluster token gesture of party hacks.
While a limited government ethos and tight electoral math straightjacketed nineteenthcentury politicians into centrist issues like tariff duties, it is also important to emphasize the
impact of deliberate agreement between the two major parties. The way in which public
debates are framed determines the border between outré and acceptable thought; this is a key
component of what Antonio Gramsci called the “manufacture of consensus.”12 A public
network of formal and informal opinion-shapers Gramsci calls “organic intellectuals” divert the
energies of criticism into informal channels of public action which often times lack the power to
make obvious systemic corrections for the greater good. Nineteenth-century “organic
intellectual” politicians engaged in a just such an act when they overemphasized the tariff
debate. Thus this essay serves as a complication of Calhoun’s implicit argument that earnest
politicians were mostly held back from forward progress by an electoral stalemate. Rather than
simply acting as receptacles for mainstream public opinion, politicians also shaped that opinion
with their choice of platform planks. In this case, both parties used tariff rhetoric to
simultaneously acknowledge their constituents’ concerns about job and wage insecurity while
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tacitly suing for inaction. By setting the major point of debate at minor differences in the tax
code, the two major parties shaped consensus around a de facto political holding action.
While Calhoun’s works elucidate the political parameters surrounding this holding
action, the works of Jeanette Rebello and Paul Krauss describe its cultural and intellectual
foundations— especially as they relate to the tariff and the Homestead incident respectively.
Jeanette Rebello’s The Great Tariff Debate attempts to rehabilitate late nineteenth-century
political culture against an aspect of the popularly imagined “Gilded Age” disingenuousness—
that of a root “intellectual bankruptcy.” Rebello’s book is one of the very few works of noneconomic history that focuses upon the tariff issue. Because of its subject The Great Tariff
Debate is also the closest peer to this paper. Her introduction reveals a blatantly rehabilitative
historiographical aim. She begins by conceding that despite its prominence in the 1880s, the
tariff, “did not definitively shape America’s rate of economic growth.” Nevertheless, she argues
that Gilded Age politicians and intellectuals who engaged in the tariff controversy comprised a
kind of intellectual laboratory— a furious effort to reconcile an identity crisis brought on by the
new industrial-era realities. “This was a truly dynamic debate, one in which the ideas of the past
were examined against the realities of the future.” Real philosophical differences between the
two Gilded Age parties reflected debates present from the country’s foundation, but the two
parties used the tariff issue to transform those positions into vicissitudes relevant to the new
industrial age: “The Democrats used the tariff to translate the Jeffersonian-Jacksonian heritage
into industrial terms. The Republicans built on the Hamilton-Clay legacy to finally adopt
protection for its own sake in 1888.” Both of the major political parties used the tariff duel for
exploring modifications to the classical-economic ideals articulated by Adam Smith and later
12

revitalized by John Stuart Mill. By attempting to update the principles of classical economics,
they rescued it from the simplified, often dogmatic symbol of laissez faire it had become for
many Americans. Politicians and economists of the day were earnest and productive in
constructing and articulating these new reforms of classical ideals-- an intellectual project
worthy of praise and respect. 13
Paul Krauss in what is perhaps the definitive modern work on the Homestead incident
modifies this idea of a national intellectual laboratory, tracing Rebello’s “dynamic debate” to
the ground level theater of the Homestead union struggle. He argues that, “the late nineteenthcentury conflicts between organized capital and organizing labor . . . embodied, to no
insignificant degree, a contest over the meaning of republicanism in modern America. The
defenders of capitalism privileged the rights of property and translated the republican
emphasis on the development of moral personality into a quantitative process measured by the
calculus of the market.” On the other hand, adversaries of unfettered capitalism tacitly argued
that in the classic republican era of the nation, before capitalism reified labor, labor’s value was
mitigated by a moral economy. This morality, they argued, should rightly extend into the
modern age and provide workers with a minimum “competence” or standard of living in
exchange for their efforts.14
In effect, Rebello and Krause argue that the tariff debate was part of a Gilded Age
intellectual and cultural laboratory for hammering out a new industrial-age identity for the
country capable of meeting the challenges of modernity, while also respecting the nation’s
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political-cultural roots. The intellectual laboratory Rebello wrote about helped produce some of
the ideological framework which the United States fourth party system later put into practice
starting in 1896. Krauss asserts that workers lacked the means to articulate their insistence on
what today is sometimes termed “moral capitalism”; Homestead workers suffered for the lack
of such intellectual products as would eventually issue from Rebello’s laboratory. But while
political and economic intellectuals were “test-marketing” various solutions to the country’s
capitalist dilemmas behind and through the tariff issue, and while workers struck for rights they
could not yet intellectually defend, federal politicians utilized tariff rhetoric to obscure the fact
that those solutions had not yet been formulated. This was its realpolitik utility, whatever
cultural values or traditions it reflected.

Anti-Pinkertonism and the Prospect of Congressional Investigations
Prior to Homestead, congressional response to the ongoing national labor struggle was
already infused with the tariff and anti-Pinkerton issues. The earliest trace of Congress’
eventual response was prompted by a freshman congressman who would leave the Democrats
in the November election and denounce his former party’s tariff position as, “a sham battle… so
that capitalists, corporations, national banks, rings, trusts, watered stock, the demonetization
of silver and the oppressions of the usurers may all be lost sight of.”15 However, back in
January, Representative Thomas Watson of Georgia limited himself to the tamer battle over
reining in Pinkerton excess. By the time the shootout at Homestead lit up the newspapers in
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early July, the country was already engulfed in a labor war which often featured Pinkerton
strike-breakers. Two years earlier a New York Rail strike in Albany shut down the rails and the
conflict with employers had purportedly resulted in the deaths of several workers at the hands
of Pinkertons.16 This had been the latest in a host of such complaints from labor about
Pinkerton murders, and in January 1892 these aggregated complaints inspired Representative
Watson to submit what was essentially an anti-Pinkerton resolution that would later evolve into
the Homestead investigation.17
The campaign against Pinkertonism was probably the most leftist pro-union issue with a
chance of passing both houses, and its lukewarm results were a good barometer of both union
unpopularity in Congress and the extreme limitations of federal power to protect workers
against employer violence. The root accusation against Pinkertons in various state legislatures
tended not to center around their violent conduct or even employers’ right to utilize them, but
rather around the charge that when they called in troops from out of state they violated the
democratically-answerable chain of police-command within the given state. A federal version of
an anti-Pinkerton law that would apply in all states would have to invoke Congress’
constitutional interstate commerce jurisdiction. Anti-Pinkerton laws were already passing fairly
easily at the state level because they advocated a relatively minor reform of the process by
which strikers were physically disciplined. Concerned politicians merely asserted that police
forces assigned to combat striking workers should be justifiably wearing a local law
enforcement badge. However, these initiatives were typically Democrat initiatives because they
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proposed to cut off large employers from an easy source of force which could act more
immediately and powerfully than local police. In environments like Homestead where the
employees had the favor of the community, the presence of quick-response “Hessian”
strikebreakers unbeholden to local sentiment could make the difference between employers’
victory or defeat at the negotiating table.18 Representative Watson sought to win a somewhat
modest political victory for his industrial-worker allies by removing larger, out-of-state troops
from their employers’ repertoire. He had no idea that so prominent an example of Pinkerton
excess was just six months away.
Continued Pinkerton violence soon provided the necessary specific grievances for
further legislative momentum, with the tariff issue looming nearby to appropriate them.
Watson failed to elucidate any specific Pinkerton sins in the resolution itself, but perhaps he felt
that by this point in their history their controversial reputation was common knowledge. No
matter. By mid-May, Chairman William C. Oates of Alabama revived Watson’s resolution. He
mentioned reports of violent Pinkerton strikebreaking activities, “from different sources, mainly
from the West” utilizing the rails to ship mercenaries across state lines.19 However, election
season had begun and both parties were beating the tariff drum. Pinkerton strikebreaking was
a particularly juicy target for Democrat blame-slinging. One month prior to the Homestead
strike while debating the relationship between the McKinley tariff and reciprocal trade
agreements with US trade partners, Democratic Senator David Turpie of Indiana quipped that
he was too hard on the Republican McKinley tariff: “I would not misrepresent the known
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effects of the policy of our political opponents…. Let us be frank, there has been both an
increase of wages and work for one class of employees- the Pinkerton detectives.”20 Even prior
to Homestead, tariff talk had absorbed the strikebreaking issue. But it remained for Congress to
determine what action, if any, it could take against the threat of Pinkertonism— whatever
connection may have existed between that threat and the tariff.
In the Gilded Age congressional investigations had become something of a joke, a
platform for partisan grandstanding to questionable practical effect.21 To the contrary, very
much like tariff rhetoric itself congressional investigations were a political tool not only for
furthering a partisan agenda but for obscuring federal helplessness to protect wage workers in
the new industrial era. The symbolic partisan attacks that congressional investigations had
become is a key component of late nineteenth-century political culture that extended beyond
even the tariff, and it was the subject of an early spat between three bickering senators early in
the process discussing the prospect of a congressional investigation into Pinkertonism.
At the prospect of such an investigation an exasperated Representative William Bynum
from Indiana complained of the inefficacy of congressional investigations into the larger issue of
strikes throughout the “Gilded Age.” Past congressional investigations into the Southwestern
Railroad system strike in 1886 and again earlier into the Reading Railroad strike in 1877 did not
convincingly suggest to congress any follow-up legislation: “The result of the [1877]
investigation was a report from the committee that Congress had nothing to do with the matter
and could not remedy the evil.”22 This was true, he noted, of the 1886 investigation as well. But

20

23 Cong. Rec. 4936-37 (1892).
Charles C. Calhoun, “The Political Culture,” 241.
22 23 Cong. Rec. 4224 (1892).
21

17

Representative Jeremiah Simpson of Kansas argued back that if big capital could command
congressional investigations, it was only fair that labor complaints might warrant them too.
Here Simpson sidestepped the practical inefficacy of congressional investigation, perhaps
because Bynum’s point was hard to argue. He then proceeded to demand an investigation
anyway. Representative Walter H. Butler of Iowa joined in with Simpson’s plea, conflating
investigations with protection. On the same subject of investigations, he exclaimed, “I say that
we have as much right to protect the American citizen, though he be the poorest laborer, in his
rights and life, if he be honest, as we have to protect the property of any corporation.”23 Clearly
investigations were a political ritual important to politicians and constituents. In many cases, in
the late nineteenth-century federal investigations may very well have been the best protection
Congress could offer. It was equally clear that in regards to strikes they had done little to help.
Calling for congressional investigations on behalf of certain groups was an opportunity for
politicians to express sympathy and appear proactive, even when that action would knowingly
lead to no legislative solutions to the underlying phenomenon. Both parties fought for the
privilege of serving in this manner as symbolic champions.

“Protection Does Not Protect”: Investigations into Homestead24
As might be expected, the “riot” at Homestead prompted a flurry of resolutions akin to
Representative Watson’s January resolution. Now members of both houses targeted the
Homestead incident specifically with calls for investigation on the grounds that hiring 300 un-
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deputized armed men from out of state to overpower workers at gunpoint surely represented
criminal excess of some kind. Both the House and the Senate immediately launched proposals
for investigations into Pinkertonism in general, and Homestead in specific. They also littered the
congressional record with insinuations of connections between Pinkertonism, Homestead, and
the tariff. Watson’s early resolution in the House had succeeded in generating momentum on
this issue since May, so the House needed only incorporate Homestead specifics to the earlier
mandate before the bill could be enacted. This readiness enabled the House to dispatch a subcommittee of the Judiciary to nearby Pittsburgh just six days after the Pinkerton barges rolled in
and were captured. A select sub-committee of House Judiciary members immediately
commenced to interview the participants. In the face of this alacrity from their sister-chamber,
Senate investigation deliberations tried to avoid redundancy and eventually focused on the
phenomenon of Pinkertonism in general to the exclusion of any particular incident.
Nevertheless the deliberations of both houses over the prospect of congressional action in the
wake of the Homestead incident revealed important dimensions to the tariff rhetoric
mechanism.
When faced with the inevitability of a congressional investigation into Homestead from
one or both houses, three types of response are particularly germane to this study. Two of
these were representative of their parties. The third was Senator Palmer’s iconoclastic
perspective. All of them, in their own ways, pointed to an underlying federal powerlessness to
mitigate the underlying suffering which caused labor riots and illustrated the use of tariff
rhetoric as a distraction from real discussions of power dynamics in the labor crisis.

19

The Democrats used tariff rhetoric in conjunction with the Homestead violence to
hammer politically vulnerable Republicans with the charge that they were key allies with the
country’s trust-forming industrial scourges. Democrats’ enthusiasm often inspired them to
overstate their case, blaming high tariff duties directly for the Homestead carnage in a feat of
awkward logic. Missouri Democratic Senator George G. Vest’s was heralded as, “acknowledged
representative of his party in this Chamber in all matters pertaining to tariff legislation.”25
Vest’s appropriation of the Homestead incident in the tariff debate was the most forcible and
dogmatic of the standard Democratic positions. Admirably, he began by addressing what he
saw as the underlying causes of the Homestead conflict: namely, trusts.
Senator Vest entered into proceedings on a Deficiency Appropriations Bill a numbered
catalogue of the various trusts his party had identified, in an attempt to blame the McKinley
tariff for their manifestation. Among them was “No. 77, Steel Trust,” in which he outlined the
campaign of the Carnegie corporation to simultaneously incorporate a number of disparate
steel manufacturers under the new “Carnegie Steel Company, Ltd.” The consolidation was part
of a renewed campaign against the Amalgamated Association union operating in many of those
plants. “In short,” he wrote, “this trust, like hundreds of others, is a conspiracy to ‘cow’ the
workingmen and defraud the consumer.”26 Democrats like Senator Vest and his constituents
saw trusts as dangerous precisely because their size rendered them impervious to the market
pressures labor could legally bring to bear to secure their own wages. His charge that trusts
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were able to “cow” laborers, such as through blacklisting or mass firings was an apt assessment
of their threat to workers.
But in 1892 this complaint against trusts was nearly always paired with the tariff, and
here Senator Vest did not stray off-script. In the same section of the record, Senator Vest
excoriated the Republicans for attempting to dodge their tariff-culpability in the strike: “in the
face of the bloodshed and the carnage at Homestead, the Senator stands here today and says
that the country is tranquil, the workingmen contented, that the most amicable relations are
existing between the employer and the employee.” 27 Here Senator Vest attacked the core of
Republican tariff-reasoning which stated that despite isolated frictions the United States
economy was successful in the aggregate. The pathos of this argument was rhetorically
weakened by the Homestead spectacle, if not its logos. Senator Vest and his party had already
fully overturned the 1888 Republican hegemony in House and Senate. In an era before more
complex polling, election results were the best indicator of a public mandate for its agenda.
Empowered by their electoral recovery in 1890, the Democrats seized the tariff rhetoric
mechanism and hammered the Republicans with the Homestead counterargument to
protectionist beneficence.
Eventually the attacks of Vest and other Democrats seemed to have driven one
Republican senator to an unorthodox defense of his party; in his desperation, Republican
Senator Eugene Hale of Maine attempted to jettison tariff rhetoric altogether. He produced a
quote from Terrance Powderly, Grand Master Workman of the Knights of Labor. “The
Democratic papers are vehement in their denunciation of the Republican party for enacting a
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tariff law under which protection was afforded to manufacturers,” Hale quoted of Powderly.
But, “the Mills [1888 tariff] Bill and the McKinley bill differ very little in the duty on steel rails,
plates, etc. One was a Democrat bill, the other a Republican.” He read on, “Democratic papers
in asserting that the trouble at that point is due to the McKinley bill, are but condemning the
very thing they themselves advocate and on which they base their claim to power- a reduction
of the tariff.”28 It was a rare thing for a Republican to compare the flagship Republican McKinley
bill to the hated Mills bill as “differing very little” in such a prominent industry. But the constant
use of the tariff rhetorical mechanism by both parties as a means for addressing nearly all
economic issues was backfiring this election for Republicans, in significant part because of
Homestead. On the 26th of July in the middle of an appropriation bill, this prompted Senator
Hale to enlist a strange ally. The result was a rare but telling admission that tariff rhetoric and
tariff specifics were two very different prospects.
House Republicans on the defensive in the Homestead issue shed an interesting light on
the tariff rhetoric mechanism; their responses were the best example of how tariff analysis
often served as merely a gesture of economic analysis. The House judiciary investigation was
the closest to a serious exploration of Homestead the nation received from its federal
legislators, and tariff rhetoric was the nearest the investigation came to mining economic
causes from beneath the violence. Two Republican members of the judiciary committee,
representatives James Buchannan of New Jersey and George W. Ray of New York, better
represented of their party’s orthodox position on Homestead than had Senator Hale. In
contrast to Hale’s unorthodoxy, they tenaciously adhered to the Republican party line. They
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were so committed to its defense that they chased the opportunity to defend it even into the
lame duck session in 1893 after Homestead was politically moot.
Even though the House investigation into Homestead was deployed quickly, the timing
of the Homestead strike itself ambushed Buchanan and Ray. Because Representative Watson’s
early Anti-Pinkerton initiative was poised to address what would become a major point of
congressional inquiry into the Homestead incident, the House was able to spring into action.
This fortuitous momentum enabled them to interview Homestead witnesses as early as July
12th. But in a cunning maneuver, opportunistic House Democrats outside the investigating
committee slapped a tariff “brand” on the investigation as it went out the door, attaching an
amendment, “that the committee be instructed to inquire whether or not the employment of
Pinkerton detectives has any connection with the present system of federal taxation.“29 This
was a kind of checkmate. Buchannan and Ray could not offer a decent rebuttal to the
implication that tariff economics underlay the Homestead violence without delaying the report
into the second session, well past the upcoming election.
In August the chairman of the committee, Colonel Oates, reported that his committee
could not submit a conclusive report on the entire incident in time for the close of the
congressional session because certain senators on the committee were busy compiling minority
opinions. Attentive readers would later learn that among these were two exacting analyses of
relevant economic statistics intended to conclusively prove that the tariff was nothing but
beneficial to the people of Homestead, Pennsylvania. Congressman Ray was mentioned by
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name as one of the straggling authors. Chairman Oates, however, released his own summary,
later the majority opinion, to the newspapers ahead of the next congress. While explaining the
delay in the release of the committee’s full report, he decried the tariff rider as ancillary and
partisan. Both parties, he grumbled, would seek to establish a connection to the tariff, and they
would do so strictly along party lines.30 It would seem, however, that Democrats had had their
fun merely insinuating Republican wrongdoing by attaching the tariff query in the first place; in
the final report the next year there were no significant Democratic opinions asserting a role for
the tariff at Homestead.
While it may have been too late for Republican House Judiciary Committee members to
attach a detailed response to the Homestead investigation in time for the election that year,
their allies in the popular press lost no time in formulating a party defense. The Republicanfavoring Penn Yan Express of Yates County, NY is nicely representative of the party’s
engagement with the opposition, as its pages were rife with references to allied and enemy
newspapers alike. On July 13 it reported that, “At this writing the mob are in complete
possession of the Homestead works.” It admitted that Republicans in Congress were relegated
to the defensive: “Even in Congress Republican leaders are silent or apologetic in behalf of the
outlaws, while a few of the more arrogant Democratic demagogues… have taken advantage of
the great calamity to make partisan capital, claiming that it is the natural result of a protective
tariff that favors the millionaires while it unmercifully oppresses the poor down-trodden
workingmen.” Republican partisan papers tended to take the rhetorical “high road” in their
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characterization of the Homestead incident, condemning Democrats for their naked
partisanship in politicizing the tragedy of Homestead. In comparison to sensationalist
Democratic politicians, Republican leaders were the level-headed statesmen doing all they
could: “It is believed in Homestead, PA that the Republican leaders will participate in the
settlement of the labor troubles.” Finally a single-sentence quote from the New York Press was
bordered all by itself: “No tariff, no mills; no mill, no strikes; no strikes, no riots. The man who
can’t see that protection is to blame for the Homestead affair must be blind.” Republican
statecraft had brought forth prosperous factories from the very ether; it was simply poor
sportsmanship to implicate them in this unfortunate but unpreventable incident. 31
House judiciary members seemed to treat the tariff amendment as a political ploy
similar to a lawyerly query the counselor knows will be overruled. In the majority opinion
Colonel Oates wasted very few words claiming the tariff did not directly cause the Pinkertons to
be employed, and left the tariff rider at that.32 For Representative Buchanan this was a great
injustice to the victims of Homestead and congressional constituents. According to him
Democrat newspapers and their allies, the “politicians of the smaller class,” had already sated a
ghoulish gluttony for the political capital that tariff blame-rhetoric reaped from the Homestead
tragedy: “While the country stood aghast at the violence and bloodshed coming so suddenly
upon a land of law and order [Democrat opportunists] danced with delight upon the new-made
graves, howled with demoniac glee at the awful scene, and sought, like a hyena, amid the
desolated homes for food for his partisan appetite.” But despite this untoward perversion of a
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genuine tragedy, he lamented, most of his colleagues failed to redress it. They willfully ignored,
“the popular belief that the instruction include(d) the idea that the committee should find what
relation, if any, the troubles, generally, at Homestead had to the tariff.” (italics mine)33
Buchannan, along with his colleague and fellow Republican Representative Ray, were
determined to compensate for their colleagues’ reticence.
While systematically proving that Homestead remained protected by a prohibitive tariff
both before and after the McKinley bill, Representative Ray joined his colleague in
acknowledging the political utility for Democrats of the Homestead and tariff pairing: “In our
own country we find a political party, seeking power, attacking the doctrine of protection and
attributing to it every evil that stalks abroad and every misfortune that overtakes men or
communities, individually or collectively. ‘War, pestilence, and famine, the three greatest
calamities that can befall mankind’ are named as the results of protection.” The tariff rhetorical
mechanism ran on melodrama; it cast heroes as well as villains. Currently, Ray boasted, the
United States rode a wave of prosperity fueled by its aggressive trade postures. “Our prosperity
is marvelous, and we have moved to the front of the nations with such rapid strides that their
jealousy has been aroused and every effort made to bring our American idea of protection into
disrepute.” However, an apocalyptic landscape plagued by hordes of hobos awaited, should
Democrat free-traders defeat Republican protectionism. “Thousands of our factories would be
closed, tens of thousands of our workingmen would go unemployed and become pauperized…
our country would be made the poorer, the condition of the masses of our people most
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miserable,” and, “strikes and riots would be increased ten, nay, an hundredfold.”34 The tariff
duel invited rhetorical hyperbole from both sides.
In Ray’s defense, hyperbole had ramped up in the 1892 political season when
Democrats rhetorically reaffirmed a commitment to “free trade”— that is, tariff duties for
federal income only. This was an act of pandering to the Democratic base the party had no
intention of honoring. As the leader of the Democratic Party, Cleveland repeatedly denied
ambitions to strip all non-revenue tariff duties in a new bill, and his earlier championing of the
relatively moderate 1888 Mills bill bore him out.35 Moreover the Democrat tariff bill which
followed his re-election later that year was so moderate that in disgust Cleveland refused to
lend his signature in protest. Serious students of the political landscape would have known that
Democrats at the federal level depended too heavily on their own cadre of capitalist
supporters, and as such they were tariff reformers— and then only reformers when it was
politically safe. But in 1892 Democrats decided to play to their base and put genuine free-trade
language into their official party platform. “We declare it to be a fundamental principle of the
Democratic Party that the Federal Government has no constitutional power to impose and
collect tariff duties, except for the purpose of revenue only, and we demand that the collection
of such taxes shall be limited to the necessities of the Government when honestly and
economically administered.”36 This tariff hyperbole incited rhetorical extremism in return such
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as that exhibited by Mr. Ray. All of this helped cultivate the power of tariff rhetoric to distract
from the real issues at stake in the Homestead incident.
While it may be argued that the Homestead’s investigation’s tariff inquiry mandate did
not explicitly invite economic analyses beyond tariff causality, both Republican minority-report
defenders did offer explanations for the conflict beyond defending the tariff from culpability.
Ray’s analysis of the real underlying causes of the Homestead dispute denied any systemic
responsibility for Homestead or like incidents, except a profligate immigration policy which
admitted “agitators and anarchists” into the country and the regrettable presence of unions.
While Ray earlier admitted that Amalgamated workers had the right to strike, he later
condemned them for exercising this power. “Had the Amalgamated Association not existed,
had the 3,400 [respective union members] … been free to exercise and act on his own
judgment… unfettered by the edicts of the officers of that association, no strike would have
occurred.”37 Thus, while rightly pointing out that tariff economics had very little impact on the
Homestead riot itself, Ray tried to ignore the disparity of political-economic power between
workers and employers which lay at the heart of the Homestead incident and indeed many
others like it.
Avoiding real analysis of underlying power structures was exactly how tariff logic
functioned, and Ray’s summation was an excellent example. As an analysis, his was the most
superficial of the Republican minority summations. Carnegie’s proposed wage cuts
disproportionately affected the highest paid workers at the plant, workers who were generally
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prosperous. As Ray’s colleague Buchanan noted, “This was no bread riot, such as the starved
elsewhere raised.”38 Ray implied that this lack of an immediate practical grievance simply made
the strikers greedy trespassers. He made a major point to draw a line between tariff policy and
Carnegie workers’ homeownership as a litmus of prosperity: “Many of the workmen formerly
employed in those mills have so prospered that they have builded (sic) themselves homes and
become the owners of other houses, which they rent.” 39 But Ray failed to explain the seeming
contradiction of the well-heeled striker. Here was a rare opportunity to explore the true
representative nature of a dispute which caused 400 materially comfortable homeowners to
besiege their former workplace at great risk to life and freedom. But it was not ultimately in the
nature of tariff-centered analysis to seriously delve into the underlying causes of the national
laborer’s crisis.
Buchannan for his part offered a deeper analysis than Ray for the cause of the strike,
and it echoed more closely Col. Oates’ majority opinion. On the subject of Pinkertonism at
Homestead, Ray had unapologetically suggested that the Pinkertons were a force which rightly
and necessarily accompanied the growth of industry. Buchannan, however, disagreed. For him
the tariff had brought nothing but prosperity to the town but, “into this was injected the
resolve of a hard, imperious man [Mr. Frick] to disintegrate the Amalgamated Association and
to employ a hireling, alien force to garrison his works while he filled them with nonunion men.
This led to the bloodshed and the horror.” 40 Buchannan thought that a smooth industrial
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operation was not only possible, but the natural result of the moral conduct of prosperous
employers.
Continuing beyond the Pinkerton presence, Buchannan’s analysis of the underlying
economic factors at play in the Homestead plant was also more judicious and insightful than
Ray’s. He compiled statistics demonstrating that under the tariff, production of steel products
had dramatically increased, the tariff rates on most of the products had actually dropped as had
the cost to consumers, and Buchannan reiterated that wages were healthy enough to make
homeowners out of many of the workmen. He also justly admitted key ambiguities in the case.
Chief among these were the unknown future effects of automation upon productivity, the
resulting effects on the price of steel products, and perhaps most importantly the lack of profit
figures from the company. Carnegie representatives refused to supply the committee with
proof of their profits. Buchannan decried this refusal on the very congressional power to
legislate the tariff in the first place: “It will not do to claim that these are details of private
business. The lawmaking power which grants protective legislation has a right as to its actual
workings.”41 No one, however, legally pressed Carnegie Steel to prove that a loss to profits
motivated the proposed wage decrease which precipitated the Homestead conflict.
Despite his thorough understanding of the economic details specified in the July
interviews, and despite his empathy for the workers’ passions, Buchannan, too, neglected to
speculate about the underlying cause of the strike before the Pinkerton barges arrived. While
Buchannan faulted the majority for failing to extrapolate the larger implication of the tariff
inquiry-mandate, he himself only went one step further and halted at clearing the tariff of any
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role in the strike. But there was a larger implication to the tariff inquiry: what were the
economic and political causes of this strike, and how might or how should the federal
government intervene to prevent such occurrences in the future? This line of inquiry would
have led to the fundamental dilemma outlined by Rebello and Krause; it would have revealed
the schizophrenia of a nation trying to honor the conflicting values of a fidelity to absolute
ownership rights and a dogmatic faith in free labor ideology.42 It would have revealed how this
dilemma led inevitably to violent conflicts between workers and employers. But like
Representative Ray, Buchannan was present primarily to clear the Republicans and their
legislative agenda of specific wrong-doing. As it had done for Ray, tariff analysis spared
Buchannan from dwelling on this conclusion. As such he confined himself to answering the
immediate mandate about the ubiquitous tariff culpability question with a lengthy, “no.”
In the Homestead investigation tariff rhetoric functioned as a feint toward deep
economic analysis of the labor question. It successfully extracted many of the strictly economic
details out of the Homestead strike, but it appropriated them for a rhetorical duel incapable of
leading to real legislative solutions to the underlying crisis which befell laborers. The House
Judiciary inquiry resulted mainly in a bland condemnation of Carnegie “excess” in hiring the
Pinkertons, and a spirited defense of protectionism from two committee members. The
immediate issue underlying the incident was wage security, and workers often struck to achieve
this with or without union leadership. After the defeat of Amalgamated at Homestead a flurry
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of wildcat strikes occurred later in Cleveland’s second administration. Here Representatives Ray
and Buchannan were able to use the tariff mechanism to counter the political-economic
gestures of their opponents, perform a gesture of economic analysis gesture of their own, and
sidestep real analysis of the underlying power dynamic detrimental to the economic security of
workers. Free labor ideology failed because it was not conceived with capitalists modes of
production in mind. Congress had absolutely no plan to mitigate this failure except minor
gestures of aggregate wealth creation and a permissive attitude toward the violent discipline of
wage workers.
Not all senators used the tariff mechanism to avoid the larger implications of
Homestead. Senator John McCaulay Palmer of Illinois was acutely aware of the underlying
economic-political tensions that Representatives Oates, Buchannan, and Ray so deftly ignored.
Almost the second an investigation into Homestead was suggested, he entered into the
congressional record an impromptu speech about the real contours of persistent labor
tensions. By pointing to the real problem of federal neglect in its current form, he provided the
nation with a small measure of antidote for the distracting effects of the tariff rhetoric. A Civil
War general for the Union and political iconoclast who switched political parties on a number of
occasions, Senator Palmer seized the Senate floor on July 7 just a day after the shootout began.
He then spoke at length about the prospect of unending labor wars in America and the duty of
federal legislators to avert it regardless of the cost to current political theory and American
traditions. As such, Senator Palmer was to the tariff mechanism the exception that proves the
rule. Refreshingly, he found the tariff question mostly beside the point.
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Senator Palmer decried the lack of congressional power to avert the current labor crisis.
Just like Representative Bynum earlier, he lamented the paltry token gesture that investigations
had become: “It is a reproach to our civilization that this Senate and country- that the Senate
has no control over [national labor strife] beyond investigation.”43 This was particularly
disturbing to Palmer because the shootout at Homestead, while it seemed to shock the nation
with the scale of its violence, was for him not an isolated friction but symptomatic of labor
relations throughout the industrial era. “It might have happened at any one of a hundred places
in the United States where large numbers of men are employed in the service of these
enormous manufacturing establishments,” he declared. This sentiment of Homestead’s
representative nature was echoed later that same day in the House when Representative John
C. Tarsney of Missouri noted, “the employment of the Pinkertons on yesterday was a mere
incident. The groundwork of that difficulty… was something entirely different, and something
that relates solely to the labor problem that is troubling the people of this country today.”44 All
effective solutions to such troubles, however, were to significant extent politically unthinkable
at the time.
The problem, as Senator Palmer saw it, was that workers had a natural right to
continued employment except in times of their employers’ genuine misfortune, or else for
genuine misdeeds. “These [Homestead] laborers having been in that service, having . . . spent
their lives in this peculiar line of service, have the right to insist upon the permanency of their
employment.” This right, furthermore, was vital to the existence of democracy itself, because in
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order for a democratic system to function properly, “You must give the voter, if you mean that
he shall be independent, a fixity of employment, so that he may defy the employer and say to
him, ‘My tenure depends not on my vote.’”45 If in a system where employers hire thousands
those employers are empowered to send workers into the street for economic-political
reasons— especially in a buyer’s labor market— corporations would marshal votes like a
bloated grotesquery of Tammany-organized neighborhood voting blocs.
What the nation needed in order to maintain wage security was the means to assure
workers “ownership” of their own employment. But as Jeanette Rebello observed, the nation
needed to achieve this while also maintaining a reasonable fidelity to employers’ rights to
conduct their businesses as they otherwise pleased. By this assessment, union power was in
fact the centrist solution, as it attempted to compensate for the absolute property rights of
capitalist owners not by subtracting from employers’ power but by adding to that of the
workers through collective bargaining. But as Homestead historian Paul Krause writes,
Amalgamated at Homestead was the last bastion of union power in the steel industry for four
decades.46 After Homestead even the “moderate” union labor solution had been destroyed for
the foreseeable future.
To be clear, the idea that workers had a natural right to their own jobs was radical to
most Americans; ensuring this idea would remain radical was a key function of tariff rhetoric as
applied to the labor crisis. Paul Krause in a chapter called “Legacies of Homestead” noted that
this conception of natural workers’ rights in the context of property law, “certainly seemed
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queer indeed to the vast majority of Americans.” But the concept was not actually alien to the
American legal tradition, merely problematic. A lawyer later representing some of the strikers
echoed Palmer’s very line of reasoning, pointing out that “Common law… holds that ‘private
right shall be subject and subservient to the public good.” 47 For Krause, this is perhaps the key
significance of the Homestead battle itself: workers demanded what some of them referred to
as a “competence,” the right to a fair standard of living in exchange for their continued service
and the investment it represented for them. But even workers could not find justification for
this “right” that would satisfy the American fidelity to traditional property rights, and neither
could their representatives. This unspoken paradox of Krauss’ competing “conceptions of
republicanism” was the primary impetus for the application of tariff rhetoric to labor analysis. It
diverted public attention from the real difficulties in solving industrial-capitalism problems like
wage security and substituted blame rhetoric packaged with the promise of slightly more jobs
or pocket money to go around.
Just after the Palmer speech, readers of the congressional record can almost read a pindrop silence. This was followed immediately by an obstinate redoubling of tariff rhetoric.
Democrat Senator Daniel T. Vorhees of Indiana rose immediately following Senator Palmer’s
insightful description of the actual paradox at the heart of the original strike at Homestead,
only to divert attention back to the tariff with a bit of word play: “[Republican tariff] doctrine
has been misleading; it has been delusive. You have made the poor people who laid down their
lives yesterday on the banks of the Monongahela believe that you were protecting them.”
Senator Vorhees thereby demonstrated the genius of the tariff rhetorical mechanism by the
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very act of immediately reintroducing it into the proceedings and his use was typical of its
rhetorical strength— to ignore rather than refute. Republican tariff protectionism indeed failed
to “protect” strikers from Pinkerton violence, but as Senator Palmer had just outlined this had
nothing to do with its rates. Yet perhaps relieved by his opponent’s return to familiar ground,
Republican Senator Hale stood up to contradict his own quote of Terrance Powderly, waging
familiar war and claiming tariff credit for “building up this great industry in that little village
which like a great hive of bees has hummed its peaceful note in years past…” The rest of the
whole affair was more of the same right into the November elections. 48
Democrats won the immediate election in 1892, and some commentators argued that
the public perception of Carnegie excess and indifference to the company’s workers’ plight
contributed to that victory.49 But in the press Senator Palmer’s suggestions were dismissed
even by the Democrat papers for his assertion of workers’ rights to continued employment.50
The Republican papers dismissed him as a Communist.51 More importantly his underlying
analysis that a lack of those rights would continue to plague the nation with labor strife was
mostly ignored. The minor “Pinkertonism” issue would slowly vanish as the Pinkerton company
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itself helped advocate for both stronger intra-state police power and a federal bureau of
investigation. It had already pioneered the primary functions of this new agency and trained
some of what would become its initial personnel. When the time came it even donated key
pieces of equipment to the new justice department bureau. Immediately after Cleveland’s
second presidential election the country was wracked by the Panic of 1893, which effectively
broke the Third Party System of electoral stalemate and commenced its Fourth Party System
successor under a Republican hegemony. Despite the passage of the seldom-invoked Sherman
Anti-Trust laws, the Fourth Party system effectively sealed into US politics an overall aversion to
seriously interfering with corporate power. This continued largely unopposed until serious
objections were entertained in Congress in the wake of the Great Depression in the 1930s. But
even in the stalemated Third Party system of the “Gilded Age,” both major parties seemed to
have mostly agreed that protection of the pro-capitalist interpretation of traditional private
property conceptions should trump the depletion of working class opportunities under the
impact of capitalism. Tariff policy was a reflection of the popularity of these priorities to the
extent that the people shared it. But it was also a clever means to discourage dissent where
they did not.

Conclusion
The issues central to the Homestead incident were echoed elsewhere in the 1892
Congressional Record. That year Congress wrestled with the logistical preparations for the
upcoming Columbian Exposition, the massive impending mega-fair undoubtedly an exaltation
of modernity. Pinkerton guards and their ilk, now in temporary public disgrace and the subject
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of a new law limiting their employ in federal service, were forbidden from the contractor list.
More amusingly tariff mania prompted one congressman to propose that plaques be affixed to
certain exhibits announcing the showcased item’s debt— or lack thereof— to tariff duties. Here
in this celebration of modernism, the tariff continued to encapsulate perfectly underlying
anxieties as to who benefited and would continue to benefit from the breakneck speed of
national technological, bureaucratic, and economic development.
Fears of national labor tumult reigned elsewhere in the 1892 Congressional Record as
well. Inside another tariff squabble a senator described the dystopian novel Caesar’s Column as
becoming frightfully prescient.52 The book like its more famous dystopian contemporary The
Time Machine depicted a horrendous future in which the world became transformed into a
Dantean landscape of perpetual class warfare.53 Paul Krause suggests that Amalgamated’s
resistance at Homestead represented an episodic swan song for contemporaneous union
power, and that its heyday had already passed prior to the strike.54 Either way Homestead
signaled to citizens, workers, and their representatives that the nation was now largely bereft
of strong labor defenders. National concerns persisted that the Wild West of an unfettered
capitalist economy would threaten the egalitarian nature of the American dream… even as that
same nation celebrated its fruits.
To a slightly lesser extent, this paradox— this confusion about capitalism’s utility— is a
burden the US citizenry still struggles with in 2019. Like our political forefathers we try to
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balance the priorities of wealth and international political-economic dominance against the
danger posed by aspects of capitalism— this time those which threaten humanity’s existence
by destroying its food and air supplies. But our “Gilded Age” predecessors had the burden of
pioneers facing this dilemma. They were the first members of a fiercely proud national culture
confronting systems impossibly larger and more complex than their own political control at the
municipal or even the state level. The first people to confront this leviathan were so dazzled by
the problem itself that rhetorically exploring its contours became the national pastime. This
process was known as tariff debate.
The Homestead incident with its sensational violence did not, in the end, prompt strong
legislation to address its underlying causes. Tariff rhetoric appropriated the riot along with
many other practical concerns and fed the people on their own grievances. The events at
Homestead were not a significant force for change. But they do represent an opportunity for
historians to see how change was avoided. Besides that, Homestead’s absorption into tariff
politics was historically significant in its own right: it provided the nation with a new benchmark
of acceptable losses in its relationship with capitalist development.
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